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Dear Reader,  
 
The Center to Advance Racial Equity (CARE) is pleased to present Economic Equity in Communities of Color: The 
Effectiveness of Minority Contracting Initiatives. At the request of the Coalition of Black Men, CARE was asked to 
provide research support to study the status of minority contracting and dig into relevant data to see how well the 
system is working. Beginning with the hiring of researcher Matt Chorpenning (MSW) and extending to include 
support from Dr. Greg Schrock and a student researcher Nathen Lamb from the Toulan School of Urban Studies 
and Planning at Portland State University, this team of three were headed by Dr. Ann Curry-Stevens. All four 
worked in deep partnership with James Posey from the Coalition of Black Men to provide for you this report.  
 
The goal of this report was originally to examine minority contracting by governments in the state of Oregon, but 
that discussion quickly grew to exist within a broader context of wage gaps for workers of color and the difficulty 
of obtaining clear data on workforce diversity. Essentially, our process has led us to discern the degree to which 
current contracting policies within various levels of government in Oregon are actually resulting in greater 
economic opportunities for communities of color. Our results, as the reader will see, are mixed, and have yet to be 
developed as the effective lever that minority contracting policies hold the potential to deliver.  
 
The case study of the Sellwood Bridge Project, conducted by Dr. Greg Schrock and Nathen Lamb, highlights these 
issues and the results can most charitably be described as mixed. While some diversity goals of the project have 
been met, a closer examination of the data reveals a significant wage gap between white workers and workers of 
color. Further, the gap is largely attributable to the fact that workers of color are concentrated in the lowest-paid 
jobs on the project. Such findings are troubling as the net impact of this public investment results in a likely 
expansion to the economic gap between workers of color and white workers, who continue to reap the most from 
the project.  
 
Significant recommendations are included at the close of the report. We remain positive about the potential of 
numerous avenues to support minority contracting but signal that these levers are not being maximized, to the 
detriment of workers and communities of color.  
 
Whether you are an elected official, or a policy maker, or someone interested in how to support racial equity, 
please do read the report. We believe it provides concrete advice for improvements to minority contracting 
policies, practices and accountability systems.  
 
Created in 2012 to provide needed resources for community groups engaged in racial equity efforts, the Center to 
Advance Racial Equity (CARE) has been linking researchers to community groups so as to better articulate needs 
and solutions that hold potential to advance racial equity. CARE has been publishing studies tied to a variety of 
local issues such as culturally responsive programing, effective data systems to document disparities, youth gang 
violence, culturally relevant food security, educational equity, environmental funding to communities of color, and 
oral health issues within the Asian and Pacific Islander community. We are pleased to add this study, Economic 
Equity in Communities of Color: The Effectiveness of Minority Contracting, to CARE’s publications.   
 
Matt Chorpenning, Ann Curry-Stevens, Greg Schrock, and Nathen Lamb 
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Executive Summary 
There is a growing body of work that documents the positive impact that government contracting to 
minority-owned businesses can have on communities of color. As an exemplar, the State of Maryland reports 
that in 2011, their $1 billion worth of contracts to state-certified Minority and/or Woman-owned Businesses 
Enterprises (MWBEs) amounted to 12,830 full-time jobs, $392 million in wages and salaries and $25.5 million 
in state and local tax receipts (Lohrentz et al, 2014).  
 
As government contracting has become more prevalent, it has come to be seen as a possible method by 
which states, counties and cities can address racial disparities (Shaw, 2010; Enchautegui et al, 1997).  The 
purpose of this report is to explore the efficacy of contracting to minority-owned businesses and the extent 
to which money awarded to minority-owned businesses makes its way into communities of color through the 
hiring of workers of color.  
 
This report also unveils, for the first time, details on minority contracting in the State of Oregon. The State of 
Oregon awarded nearly $2 billion in contracts in 2013 to all contractors. The State had the explicit goal of 
directing 10% of that money to minority-owned or woman-owned businesses as a means of providing 
economic opportunity to populations who typically experience systemic barriers. Oregon fell well short of its 
goal (barely 1% of funds distributed were awarded to women-owned or minority-owned businesses) and yet 
2013 marked the first year that minority-owned and woman-owned businesses received more than 1% of 
contract dollars. Viewing these weak results in comparison with the progress that has been emerging in 
Multnomah County, Metro and the City of Portland, we encourage the State to seriously and immediately 
address the status of minority contracting in its department.  
 
Our examination of the Sellwood Bridge project reveals both the progress made toward racial equity in 
contracting and the distance yet to travel. As per project goals, workers of color do make up 20% of the 
workforce on the project, and actually hold almost half of such positions. However, they are mostly grouped 
in the lowest-paying jobs on the project, with no clear path for career advancement. White workers make 
almost five dollars per hour more on the Sellwood Bridge project than all workers of color combined; when 
we compare African Americans to White workers, the gap doubles. Furthermore, minority-owned businesses 
receive much smaller subcontracts than mainstream firms on the project, despite evidence that minority-
owned businesses tend to hire more diverse workforces.  
 
A survey of relevant literature reveals several features of effective, accountable minority contracting 
programs, among them:  
• Clear, accessible data that the public can view in real time (Jaja, 2013) 
• Stiff penalties for fraud (Bates and Williams, 1995) 
• Clear program goals, including long-term aspirations that can be reflected in bids from potential 
contractors (Jaja, 2013; Flynn, 2014; Lohrentz et al, 2014) 
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• State assistance in the certification process so minority-owned businesses can navigate the often 
cumbersome steps to being certified as a Minority/Woman-Owned/Emerging Small Business or 
MWESB (Bates and Williams, 1995; Lorhrentz et al, 2014) 
 
The recommendations put forth here are rooted in our case study of the Sellwood Bridge and a growing body 
of research in the area of minority contracting by government entities. Our central recommendation is that 
governments prioritize the creation of a regional system that ensures that minority contracting is as effective 
as possible. We must ensure that we generate real economic gains for minority owned businesses, for 
workers of color, and for their local communities where children are raised. The second theme in our findings 
is the imperative to ensure that policies are translated into effective performance measures. Too many 
policies are ineffective because of the absence of accountability practices. Third, we must collect clear data 
to support the achievement of diversity goals on contracted projects and that the data collected be made 
accessible in real time, so the public can see and evaluate for themselves whether or not their tax dollars are 
promoting equity and economic opportunity for communities of color.  
 
The central recommendation is to implement a regional strategy to provide improved opportunities for 
minority contractors (Lohrentz et al, 2014). This strategy should ideally: 
1. Require active participation of all departments and agencies 
2. Include clear goals and benchmarks 
3. Provide assistance in navigating the MWESB certification process  
4. Develop and employ standardized methods of data collection and reporting that are clear, 
accountable, and accessible to the public in real time 
 
Four additional categories of recommendations are included in this report: (1) accountability and data 
systems, (2) innovations, (3) incentives and sanctions, and (4) discourse and awareness efforts. The need for 
readily available and accurate data accompanied by clear goals in minority contracting cannot be overstated; 
in an audit of Metro's MWESB program, Flynn (2014) found that Metro staff were not always clear on the 
goals of the program and that annual reports were publishing data from the wrong fiscal year. Since annual 
reports tend to be the method by which interested citizens obtain information about such programs, unclear 
data can lead to unclear results and a skewed picture of what is really happening.  
 
We retain a goal for all levels of government to dig comprehensively into its progress on minority 
contracting. We want to ensure that taxpayer money for public construction has a long reach into 
communities of color. This would lead to diversity for the sake of equity as opposed to diversity for the sake 
of diversity. To move effectively forward, we urge real partnerships with community advocates, including 
those who have been on the receiving end of inequities of such contracting practices.  
 
There is clear intention within the Portland metropolitan area and Multnomah County to address issues of 
racial equity; our hope with this report is that steps are taken to move from intention to measurable results.  
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Introduction  
As the movement for racial equity takes hold in Portland, Oregon, we look for examples of where the living 
conditions of communities of color are improving. One concrete initiative that many point to is the 
“protected contracting” initiatives that are entrenched in both policy and practice at most levels of 
government. It is laudable that our governments have committed themselves to ensuring that the businesses 
owned by persons of color (called “minority owned businesses”) have an increasing slice of public dollars that 
are spent on various contracts and subcontracts.  
 
Before, however, we become celebrate this commitment, we wanted to make sure that the promised results 
were actually occurring. In research conducted for a 2010 report on racial disparities in the region, three 
findings raised concerns. The first was the obscuring of results for business owners of color when 
government data reports amalgamated minority-owned businesses with women-owned businesses and 
emerging small businesses. When we were able to disaggregate these reports, it was clear that few dollars 
were going to businesses of color. The second was that there were few minority-owned businesses in Oregon 
and that it appeared that fewer still were gaining certification to become eligible for “protected contracting” 
initiatives. The third was that few dollars made it into the “protected contracting” arena, and the vast 
majority of contracts continue to be awarded to white-owned businesses.  
 
These 2010 findings needed some updating, as recent reports have been released on the status of minority 
contracts in the city, the county, metro and the state. We share these findings in this report. We also share 
our assessment of the effectiveness of data reports to document the equity that exists in government 
contracting practices. The bottom line? Many improvements are still needed.  
 
Also on our radar are major public works projects, including the Sellwood Bridge project that has marked the 
largest local public expenditure in recent years. This report digs into the available data and we explore how 
well the objective of 20% to go into protected contracting, and 20% of the project’s hours to be worked by 
people of color. Our findings are that these goals have not been fully reached. We also expand our analysis of 
the Sellwood Bridge records to examine the profile of workers of color on the project, their average pay level, 
the types of employment secured, and the degree of investment that these workforce numbers create for 
our various communities in the region. All remain troubling.  
 
And yet, we are far from ready to suggest these initiatives are not successful. This report also details the 
results of our literature review on the topic, and the types of improvements that could be made to our local 
contracting practices so as to ensure improved results.  
 
We conclude this report with concrete recommendations for data systems, contracting practices, and 
transparency of progress, alongside ways to handle shortfalls in meeting objectives.  
 
We very much look forward to ongoing dialogue with public officials responsible for these initiatives, and 
hope to ensure that in the next five years, gains can be made to the ways that public dollars are invested. 
Racial equity, narrowing the gap between workers of color and white workers, and improving the role of 
businesses of color so as to help expand the wellbeing of communities of color are our goals. We seek the 
support of public leaders to act on our recommendations and use public contracting to expand racial equity.  
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Minority Contracting Policy History 
Summary of the Status of Minority Contracting 
Government efforts to increase contracting to minority-owned businesses can be traced back at least as far 
as the Nixon Administration. In 1969, Richard Nixon signed Executive Order 11458, which gave the Secretary 
of Commerce authority to “Coordinate as consistent with law the plans, programs, and operations of the 
Federal Government which affect or may contribute to the establishment, preservation and strengthening of 
minority business enterprise” (para 3). The order also established the Minority Business Development Agency 
(Rice, 1991). When the Supreme Court ruled, in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), that government set-aside 
programs were a valid method for Congress to use in order to combat past discrimination, such programs 
“proliferated nationwide to include some 36 states and 190 localities by the late 1980s” (Rice, 1991, p.114).  
 
However, two later Supreme Court rulings had a tremendous dampening effect on government contracting 
policy in the United States. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989), the Court ruled that state and local 
set-aside programs (those that were intended to address inequity by requiring a certain amount of contract 
dollars be set aside for minority business enterprises) could only be allowed to exist if they satisfied two 
requirements of “strict scrutiny.” First, they must be “justified by compelling governmental interest” and 
second, they must be “narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose” (p.1). In 1995, the Court, in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, applied the same strict scrutiny standard to all federal set-aside 
programs. Enchautegui et al (1997) sum up the impact of these rulings: “Proponents of race-based policies 
intended to help minorities must meet the same high standard of proof required for proponents of race-
based practices that disadvantage minorities” (p.ix). It is perhaps unsurprising then that Enchautegui et al 
found in their 1997 national study that “minority-owned businesses receive far fewer government contract 
dollars than would be expected based on their availability” in a post-Croson America (p.x).  Riccucci (2007) 
found that “the concept of strict scrutiny has been applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary manner and, 
therefore, should not serve as the basis for judicial review of affirmative action programs” (p.124).  
 
Following Croson and Adarand, a burden of proof has been placed upon governments, state or local, to 
establish a history of discrimination before enacting a remedy such as a set-aside program. This proof has 
typically been supplied in the form of disparity studies which have varied widely in cost and rigor. Rice (1992) 
found, however, that carefully conducted disparity studies “may assist state and local entities in devising 
MBE set-aside programs that will expand minority access to government contracts” (p.489).  
 
Enchautegui et al (1997) wrote that, “Procurement – like public employment – provides governments with a 
potentially powerful tool for promoting minority opportunities and counteracting discrimination” (p.vii). Our 
concern here is to gain an understanding of how effectively this tool is being used in Oregon, with a specific 
focus on contracts awarded by the state, Multnomah County, the City of Portland, and Metro.  
 
In their 2010 report, Communities of Color in Multnomah County: An Unsettling Profile, Curry-Stevens et al 
noted that only 7% of all of Oregon's licensed businesses were owned by people of color. New data is 
expected to be released in 2015 when we will see if things have improved, but the Coalition report points out 
that “while 20,677 minority-owned businesses operate in Oregon, only 3.3% of them are certified, and fewer 
still are certified as 'minority-owned businesses' for procurement eligibility” (p.55).  Because government 
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contracting can be so lucrative and can bring with it opportunities for technical assistance, the ability of 
minority-owned businesses to compete on a level playing field for contracts is essential to addressing racial 
equity and creating real economic opportunity for communities of color.  
 
The 2010 Unsettling Profile report examined funding to minority-owned, women-owned, and emerging small 
businesses (MWESB) from Multnomah County, Metro, and the City of Portland. The report found that, at all 
three levels, minority-owned businesses were not receiving the amount of government contract dollars that 
could be expected in a barrier-free environment. In fact, the data revealed that, within Portland's protected 
contracting practices, “where there is an intention to increase the City's awards to communities of color, 
White men gain the lion's share of these dollars, etching out 51% of the awards for their own businesses” 
(p.54). The report found that, within the field of construction, minority-owned businesses in the city of 
Portland received just $80,749 of $91 million in construction contracts from the city – just 0.088% of the total 
money awarded from 2007 to 2008.  
 
The 2010 Coalition report identified four priorities for improving contracting to minority-owned businesses:  
• Better outreach and supports to expand certification practices 
• Reporting on the equity achievements of Workforce Training and Hiring programs 
• Affirmative action initiatives that ensure “removal of all employment barriers to full workforce 
participation of people of color” 
• The advancement of equity concerns in development agendas across all government levels (p.57) 
The report also highlighted the need for changes to the macro context in which MWESBs are attempting to 
thrive: “When people of color have few assets, are impoverished and face social exclusion and discrimination 
on a regular basis, they are not likely to take risks and build their own businesses” (p.57). This conclusion 
echoes the finding of Enchautegui et al (1997) more than a decade earlier, when they identified two types of 
barriers faced by minority firms: “(1) barriers to firm formation and growth, and (2) barriers to participation 
in the government contracting process itself” (p.viii).  
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Current Status of Oregon, Multnomah County, Metro and the City of Portland 
Because the 2010 Coalition of Communities of Color Report drew from governmental annual reports, it is 
relatively simple for us to update the numbers for the County, City of Portland, and Metro and identify 
trends. To establish a statewide context, we will begin with a look at the data reported by the Oregon House 
Bill 2667 Task Force in September of 2014.  
 
State of Oregon 
As of June, 2014, the State of Oregon has 3,309 firms that are certified as MWESB firms (that is, minority-
owned, women-owned and emerging small businesses).1 Because updated data on all Oregon businesses will 
not be available until 2015, we can only compare to the 2007 data used in the report by Curry et al (2010). 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of Oregon's total number of licensed businesses with the most recent data 
available to us.  In the table below, we see that Oregon is well behind the USA averages for the presence of 
communities of color in licensing their own firms.  
 
Table 1. Oregon's Licensed Firms 
2007 Oregon USA 
Total number of firms 348,154 27,092,908 
Black-owned firms 1.2% 7.1% 
American Indian and Alaska Native-owned firms 1.2% 0.9% 
Asian-owned firms 3.6% 5.7% 
Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander-owned firms 0.2% 0.1% 
Latino-owned firms 3.3% 8.3% 
White-owned firms 90.5% 77.9% 
Source: Census Bureau’s Survey of Business Owners 2007.2 
 
In this same time period, the population of Oregon was 77.5% White, and in the USA was 62.2% White. This 
translates into a greater racial disparity in Oregon: an Oregon resident of color more than two times less 
likely to become a business owner than, on average, elsewhere in the nation, while a White Oregonian is only 
half as likely as their national counterparts to own a business. This signals a magnitude of barriers to business 
ownership that will partially be explained by differential wealth levels, for wealthier people who are much 
more likely to be White are more likely to start businesses. Also implicated is access to credit, as people of 
color are much less likely to be approved for credit, and are much more likely to not apply due to fear of 
being turned down (Robb, 2013).3  
 
Coupled with these larger forces that deter and render many in communities of color unable to create 
businesses, we also face challenges in accessing MWESB certification. The data below shows the Oregon-
wide data on the racial breakdown of these firms.  
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Table 2. The racial breakdown of the certified D/MWESB firms in the state as of June, 2014.  
Racial Identity, June 2014 % Number of firms 
African American/Black 6.3% 210 
Asian and Pacific Islander 5.2% 171 
White 70.9% 2347 
Latino 8.7% 287 
Native American 3.4% 114 
Other 0.5% 15 
Subcontinent Asian 2.0% 66 
Unknown 3.0% 99 
Source: Oregon’s State Legislature 2014 report on compliance with HB 2667 (p.9).4 
 
Excluding the categories of “Other” and “Unknown,” in order to keep the data as clear as possible, we see 
that barely one quarter (25.62%, which is 848 businesses) of the certified MWESB firms in the entire state of 
Oregon could be accurately described as minority-owned businesses. In fact, nearly 71% of certified MWESBs 
are owned by white people, due to the overwhelming majority of this amalgam being awarded to “emerging 
small businesses” which while facing challenges in becoming established, are almost completely owned by 
white people, and mostly by white men. Disaggregated by gender, the 2,347 white MWESB owners break 
down to 1,794 white men (54%) and 1,515 white women (46%). Put another way, more white men in Oregon 
own certified MWESBs than all of the identified racial minorities combined.  
 
Curry-Stevens et al pointed out that, as of 2010, “while 20,677 minority-owned businesses operate in 
Oregon, only 3.3% of them are certified” (p.55). Using the 2014 data from the State of Oregon, we can see 
that percentage has increased to 4.1%. Still, a staggering 95.9% of minority-owned businesses in our state are 
not certified as MWESBs and therefore miss out on the opportunities provided through specialized 
procurement programs.  The HB 2667 Task Force (2014) lists several challenges to MWESB certification, 
including a cumbersome application process, no guarantee of benefit, and payment delays that can be 
especially problematic for smaller vendors (p.21).  
 
As part of its 2013 Ten Year Plan for Oregon, the State set a goal that “State contracts with minority-owned 
or woman-owned businesses meet or exceed 10% of the value of all agency contracts every year where 
eligible firms exist” (quoted in Myers, 2013, p.3). The State separates minority and woman-owned businesses 
into a discrete category apart from emerging small businesses but does not separate the two groups further. 
This level of aggregation is still problematic (as it was for Curry-Stevens et al in 2010) but the State reports 
awarding $25,802,073 of almost $2 billion to the combined minority and/or women-owned business 
category. That amounts to 1.32% of contract dollars, 8.68% short of the stated goal. And yet, the state 
reports that 2013 is “the first time since data has been collected” that contracting to minority-owned and/or 
woman-owned businesses topped 1% of total funds (p.3). In the State's 2013 report, we see that minorities 
and women have increased their share of state contracts from 0.78% ($19.8 million of $2.57 billion) of total 
funds in 2010 to 1.32% in 2013. When this data is combined with the fact that more certified MWESBs in 
Oregon are owned by white men than all identifiable minorities combined, it is logical to ask whether 
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contracting to MWESBs is actually that much of a benefit for communities of color or if other steps might 
need to be taken in order to increase economic opportunities for marginalized communities.  
 
Table 3. State of Oregon Contracting to Minority and/or Women-owned businesses, 2009-2013. 
Calendar 
Year 
Total Spend 
Value 
Minority & 
Women Spend 
Value 
Minority & 
Women % 
Non Minority & 
Women Spend % 
Reporting 
Agencies 
Agencies with 
Minority & 
Women Spending 
2009 $8,849,411,955 $4,798,452 0.05% 99.95% 11 9 
2010 $2,566,371,942 $19,846,134 0.78% 99.22% 11 5 
2011 $3,519,269,608 $33,017,961 0.92% 99.08% 12 12 
2012 $2,523,496,452 $11,180,702 0.44% 99.56% 21 15 
2013 $1,957,796,353 $25,802,073 1.32% 98.68% 21 17 
 
Graphically representing the percentage of expenditures that are explicitly and directly aiming to remedy the 
lack of investment of public dollars into minority-owned businesses, we reproduce Figure 1 to show the 
percentages from the above chart.  
 
 
0.1% 0.8% 0.9% 0.4% 1.3%
100.0% 99.2% 99.1% 99.6% 98.7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 1
Percentage of Oregon State Spending to Explicitly Support 
Minority and Women Businesses, 2009 to 2013
Minority & Women %
Non Minority & Women Spend %
2013 State target of 10%, missing 
by 8.7 percentage points 
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In the above chart, we see the improvements in State contracting practices in the larger context where 
minority businesses continue to get a meager slice of public investments.  
 
Our next look at data from the State of Oregon shows the racial breakdown of its MWESB firms. These data 
are not available annually (or not been disclosed annually), but rather as an amalgam of the last five years.  
 
 
Source: Oregon’s State Legislature 2014 report on compliance with HB 2667 (p.15).5 
 
These numbers are concerning. The Unsettling Profile report documented pervasive problems with minority 
contracting practices improving access to contracts by businesses of color because the vast majority of 
awards go to emerging small businesses and women-owned businesses. This pattern clearly extends to the 
State of Oregon and needs immediate attention.  
 
We turn next to a review of Oregon’s data on the nature of the contracts secured by minority businesses. The 
first issue is that the business most used by the State is translation. This service outpaces all others, and holds 
18.7% of the contracts awarded (more than 250 such awards over the last 5 years). While this is not 
necessarily a problem (and the median salary for translators is $45,000/year compared with the national 
median wage of $35,000/year),6 it suggests that minority contracts are having greater difficulty penetrating a 
more expanded set of occupations.  
 
Finally, we turn to examine the departmental patterns of hiring MWESB contractors. There is wide variation 
among departments that demonstrates which departments are tough to access. Three awarded no MWESB 
contracts: Oregon Health Licensing Authority, Oregon Marine Board and the Public Employees Retirement 
System. These bodies awarded relatively few contracts so might remain a lesser priority for reforms. The next 
batch include very large contractors, and also include those which have been addressing racial equity for a 
Asian
4.4%
Black
2.1%
White
83.5%
Latino
6.7%
Native American
3.4%
Figure 2
Breakdown of awards to MWESB firms by race, 
2009-2013, Oregon 
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high number of years. The departments that, by all estimation, should be more effective in integrating 
minority businesses but are falling significantly short include the Oregon Medical Board, the Department of 
Human Services, the Department of Corrections, The Oregon Health Authority, the Oregon State Policy, and 
the Department of Justice. We are surprised to see these departments among the worst performers in 
MWESB contracting.   
 
 
Source: The HB 2667 Task Force (2014). Breakdown of Agency Purchases, dated 07/02/14.7 
* Note that of the 258 MWESB contracts awarded by ODE, 207 (or 80.2%) of these were for translation services. 
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Four messages become clear as these data are reviewed in their entirety:  
• The State of Oregon has been unable to significantly improve equity within its contracting practices 
• The people of Oregon are unable to discern how minority businesses are benefiting from public 
contracting expenditures (because these data combine women-owned businesses with minority 
businesses) 
• The State of Oregon does not have key data systems in place to be able to see annual progress 
• The State of Oregon does not have an effective strategy in place to meet its targets 
 
We look forward to dialogue within the State to establish responses to these challenges in the 
implementation of minority contracting policies and procedures.  
 
 
Multnomah County 
Moving our analysis to the County level, we did see some improvement from 2009 to 2012 (as shown in 
Figure 4), but significant erosion of gains for minority-owned businesses occurred in 2013, taking the level of 
awards to levels lower than they were in 2009, at 5.2%. Back in 2009, Multnomah County, awarded 10 prime 
contracts worth $1,112,492 to Minority Business Enterprises, which was 6.1% of prime contract awards from 
the County in 2009. In 2013, minority-owned businesses received 11 of 135 prime contracts (6.29% of the 
total awarded) for $1,886,058 (5.2% of the total prime contract funds awarded). In each metric – the dollars 
awarded, the number of contracts, and the percentage these awarded dollars make up of total awards has 
dropped in the past year.  
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Source: Curry-Stevens et al (2010) for 2009 data, and Multnomah County Purchasing Report 2013 for remaining 
data.8  
 
We look forward to seeing Multnomah County engage seriously with community advocates on this issue. 
While their reporting is easier to grasp, and the portion of funds awarded to minority-owned businesses 
more clear, the results are troubling.  
 
 
Metro  
Metro's goal as of 2010 was 17% of contract dollars to MWESBs and they hit 16% as of 2006/2007, which is a 
level that has not ever been achieved. These data, as previously mentioned, were not disaggregated and so it 
is hard to establish a baseline for minority-owned businesses when comparing the data published in 2010 to 
now. However, looking at the 2012/2013 annual report for Metro's MWESB program, the data is 
disaggregated and we can get a sense of how minority-owned businesses are doing with regards to Metro 
contracts.  
 
In Fiscal Year 2012/2013, Metro awarded 397 contracts worth $44,679,083. Of those, MWESBs received 138 
contracts (34.7% of the total contracts) worth $5,900,894 (13.2% of total dollars). When we break that data 
down further, we see that minority-owned businesses received 28 contracts (7% of all contracts awarded) 
worth $1,286,407 (2.8% of total dollars awarded). The 2012/2013 annual report does not mention a 
$1,112,492
(=6.1%)
$2,672,637
(=9..3%)
$2,646,879
(=13.2%)
$1,886,058
(=5.2%)
$18,237,574
$26,043,275
$17,433,700
$34,489,612
$0
$5,000,000
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
$20,000,000
$25,000,000
$30,000,000
$35,000,000
$40,000,000
2009 2011 2012 2013
Figure 4
Prime Contract Awards, Multnomah County, 
2009 to 2013
Minority Businesses Non-Minority Businesses
16 
 
utilization goal for all MWESBs but does state that the program wants “to strive for a utilization rate that 
mirrors availability of firms in each category, by industry, according to the most current Census and US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data. For instance, if the makeup of the tree pruning market were 4% MBE, then 
ideally Metro would expect to have a utilization rate close to that number” (Metro 2013, p. 5).  
 
Figure 5 shows the uneven nature of the expenditures into disadvantaged businesses by Metro. There was an 
audit in 2014 that surfaced many inaccuracies and problematic practices in their procurement processes that 
suggest that these results are not, however, reliable.  
 
 
Source: Metro's FY 2012/2013 annual report (p. 6) and shows their utilization from 2003 through 2013, and updated 
added to with Metro’s 2013/14 annual report figures.9 
 
In 2010, Curry-Stevens et al expressed concerns about the results of the utilization data they had examined, 
saying that “the results show that these policies do not ensure equitable outcomes, nor are the results 
improving. The pattern is tremendously uneven” (p.56). We can see while progress is being made in the last 
three years, utilization data for all MWESBs remains short of the goal cited in 2010 at 17%. If one were only 
to examine the last three years, progress would be deemed exemplary, but we are reticent to believe this is a 
durable improvement.  Doubt, however, as to the accuracy of these figures exists.  
 
Metro published an audit of their MWESB procurement program in March of 2014 that leads us to question 
the accuracy of the above data: Auditor Flynn pointed out that “Metro reported different numbers for the 
same fiscal year in two different budget documents. Further, the measures in the budget did not match those 
in the annual report” (p.9).10 In a more concerning conclusion, the Auditor’s office states, “Over the past four 
years, the report was completed by four different analysts and we found no clear or consistent guidance on 
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how to create it. In addition, there was no process in place to catch potential errors or inaccuracies. As a 
result, the MWESB utilization data was not comparable between years.”11  
 
 
The audit includes a memorandum, sent to all Metro councilors, from Auditor Suzanne Flynn which states, 
“Our examination found weaknesses in program design and implementation” and pointed out problems with 
clarity of goals, a need for well-developed activity areas, compliance and a need for better performance 
measures (p.iii).  
 
The concern here is that public expenditures are a matter of public record; if the data pulled for this report is 
problematic or inaccurate, it becomes difficult for taxpayers concerned with racial equity to gain a clear 
understanding of the current climate regarding minority contracting. Flynn (2014) has this to say about the FY 
2012/2013 data, examined above: “The FY 2012-13 annual report included information about activities that 
happened outside of the fiscal year covered by the report. This may provide an inaccurate picture of the 
program's activities and their effectiveness” (p.10).  Shaw (2010) highlights transparency as a necessary 
component of any functional contracting program, and points out, “There is no apparent transparency when 
the average citizen has no idea what is happening in government or understands the public procurement 
process, or is unable to interpret contracts for outsourced services” (p.11).  
 
While there are gains made in outreach, partnerships, tracking systems and a targeted showcased item (of an 
Oregon Zoo exhibit for condors), the program still manifests a dominant pattern of negligible, albeit 
important, investments into communities of color.  
 
 
Source: Metro’s 2013/14 MWEST Annual Report  
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We urge Metro to consider the results of these investments, and to understand that should these patterns 
continue, White communities will flourish as communities of color face stalled economic prospects. Working 
more assertively to engage with and support minority owned businesses and to direct resources into the 
sector will require a more comprehensive approach. 
  
City of Portland 
The City of Portland has a troubling record with minority contracting. Curry-Stevens et al (2010) detailed the 
findings from 2007-2008, during which time the City “allocated only 0.09% of its contracting dollars to 
minority-owned businesses” (p.54).  
 
In June of 2011, the Portland City Council passed Resolution No. 36868 that required the city to take 
immediate steps to improve the City’s equity programs, passed on the heels of an updated Disparities Study 
(with the last once conducted in 2009) that assessed the need for a MWESB initiative. The Disparities Study 
confirmed such a need, and formal impetus was afforded by the City to improve equity in contracting. 
 
Additional steps were outlined in Resolution No. 36944, passed in July 2012 that set a goal of 27% for 
minority- and women-owned businesses in construction projects, and related supports to achieve this target 
such as requiring equity when subcontracts are established, including expanded rules to maximize 
accessibility and reduce the emphasis on pre-qualification on projects under $250,000. These initiatives are 
credited with the heightened expectations for equity within the Sellwood Bridge Project 
 
In 2012/2013, the City of Portland reported out on a total of three sectors for which minority-owned data 
was available. In these fields of Construction (formal and informal), Housing, and Professional, Technical & 
Expert (PTE) Service, the City awarded contracts totaling $462,191,060. In those fields, minority-owned 
businesses received contracts totaling $36,381,160. As a share of the total city contracts awarded, it comes 
to 7.9% of total funds, as shown in Figure 7. 
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Source: City of Portland Procurement Services Annual Report, 2012/13.12 
 
These are important gains, not to be maligned. Moving the institution from 0.09% to 7.9% of contracting 
dollars over a five-year period is considerable and there should be important learnings here for other 
jurisdictions. The types of efforts that seem to be helpful in expanding these gains include the following, with 
critiques being wrapped into these descriptions because the initiatives have emerged with variations and 
inconsistences that limit their ability to work in the ways they were intended: 
• Good Faith Effort Program that asks larger prime construction contractors to subcontract with minority- 
and women-owned businesses when possible 
o Critique: Without accountability, the program is seen by most minority contractors as a “check 
the box” exercise that has a low threshold, with no consequence for failing to show good faith. 
The process is actually a nuisance to minority contractors and creates false expectations. 
• Workforce Training and Hiring Program that aims to diversity its own workforce in public works by 
expanding apprenticeship opportunities in 20% of hours in each trade.  
o Critique: As yet, we have not seen if the numbers of apprenticeship hours has increased. Sharing 
results is needed to see whether this program is increasing equity.   
• Sheltered Market Program that aims to expand access to City contracts under $200,000, by allowing 
MWESB-certified firms to enroll for up to five years to have access to these construction projects.  
o Critique: A City audit of this program in 2010 demonstrated numerous problems including 
discovery that 76% of these contracts were awarded to white-owned businesses over a 12-year 
history of the program.13 This is a slice of a bigger problem whereby (in 2007/08) less than 1/10 
of one percent of all construction contract dollars were awarded to minority businesses.14 In 
addition, data systems were flagged as inadequate for tracking outcomes. Also, the results of the 
program – supporting disadvantaged businesses to graduate through to open competitions for 
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contracts – was inadequate: only 66 of 306 participating firms graduated. Greater transparency 
on the current program results, validated by minority contractors, would be valuable for 
confirming the program is reporting improved results.  
• Technical Assistance Program that provides classes in areas such as computer programs, bidding, 
estimating and creating business plans.  
o Critique: Training for development in areas like bidding and estimating, and computer literacy 
went away with the advent of the Prime Contractor Development program. There may be some 
elements of it on their one CBA project but those services are generally not accessible for most 
minority contractors.  
• Prime Contractor Development Program that provides support for businesses transitioning to higher 
contract levels, with education and technical assistance provided. 
o Critique: The composition of this group heavily reflects white males or DBE contractors who have 
a reputation for hiring their own people. Of the members of the Tier 1 team, 9 of 15 members do 
not hold experience as minority contractors, and in the Tier 2 team, 9 of 14 members do not 
have this experience. It should be an effective program but diversity without accountability for 
making improved decisions with improved results remains hollow. It is a perfect example of 
“diversity for the sake of diversity rather diversity for the sake equity.” It gives the appearance of 
influence when fact, it has no influence on the procurement making process for real. There are 
no numbers to demonstrate effectiveness.  
• Minority Evaluator Program that aims to evaluate contract bids by a panel of at least three people, one 
of which must represent the interest of minority contractors.  
o Critique: This program lacks power to influence hiring, or even recommend hiring of people of 
color or minority-owned businesses. The panels have difficulty recruiting minority contractors. 
Numerous minority contractors find fault with the creation of the program and its 
implementation.  
  
These interventions have, however, been unable to take the program close to the goal of 27% set in 2012 for 
contracts awarded to minority- and women-owned businesses.  
 
In the next section, we will examine the problem of obtaining clear data regarding minority contracting, 
through a conversation with James Posey, who has been a minority contractor in the Portland area for more 
than 25 years.  
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Problems with Data Collection and Reporting 
James Posey has been a minority contractor in Portland for 25 years, is a former president of the Portland 
Coalition of Black Men, co-founder of the local chapter of National Association of Minority Contractors – 
Oregon (NAMC-Oregon) and founded the Black Portland Agenda (BPA) Report in 2012 “to create a better 
dialog about policies that effect Portland's African American community” (BPA website, “James Posey,” para. 
5). Mr. Posey approached the Center to Advance Racial Equity (CARE) earlier this year to help examine 
minority contracting issues. Although a broader review of the literature is in the next section, it is instructive 
to connect some of Mr. Posey's assertions to current research in the field.  
 
When asked why he was driven to pursue this project, Mr. Posey pointed to his own experience as a minority 
contractor and mentioned witnessing “many fallacies, hypocrisy and outright fraudulent nature of many of 
the programs purported to help minority contractors level the playing field. While these programs 
theoretically are designed to increase minority participation in the lucrative construction market, they in fact 
often have the opposite result” (James Posey, personal communication, November 23, 2014). Posey's 
thoughts here are substantiated by Sweet's (2006) study of minority contracting in three major metropolitan 
areas (including Portland), in which he concludes “As a result of the MBE programs in these three cities, 
minority employment did not significantly increase and extant racial disparities in employment did not 
significantly decrease” (p.180, emphasis from original publication).  
 
Posey is also concerned with the proportion of government contracts that are going to minorities: 
“Minorities need an equitable share of these opportunities in order to support the general welfare of their 
families and communities. To the extent we monitor and measure their participation, we can predict 
socioeconomic benefits to communities of color, which ultimately benefit the entire community” (Posey, 
2014). The question of measuring participation and performance accurately is taken up by Flynn (2014), who 
found that Metro's MWESB procurement program “had not developed guidelines to ensure accuracy and 
consistency of measures” in their reporting processes.  Posey has sought data on various projects in the 
Portland metropolitan area and has found, “Often the data is not collected at all but when it is collected it is 
incomplete, misleading and/or misrepresented.” He suggests that data is collected and reported “for the 
purpose of making the agency look good or at least shielding it from criticism.”  
 
We can illustrate this point by examining the Sellwood Bridge Project's Diversity Dashboards, published on 
the project website, www.sellwoodbridge.org. The December 2014 dashboard, which contains data as of 
November 30th, 2014, shows that the project has yet to meet its goal of 20% minority contracts – standing at 
16.5% of awards, but at only 9% of paid contracts. While there is considerable racial diversity among 
potential suppliers (with African Americans at 43%, Native American firms at 14%, Latino at 4% and Asian and 
Pacific Islanders at 1%), this does not translate into equity for the contracts awarded. Digging into the 
workforce data, however, shows more pressing concerns. A closer examination of the data, conducted by 
Greg Schrock and Nathen Lamb, shows that two thirds of African Americans currently employed on the 
project are flaggers, who earn the lowest base hourly rate of all trades (more than four dollars less per hour 
than the next lowest-paying trade). Multnomah County accurately states workforce composition but their 
choice to not report what most of those jobs are and where they are on the wage scale suggests an effort to 
obscure less desirable features of the Sellwood Bridge Project. Detailed workforce data on employment 
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disaggregated by race and trade is not published on the website along with the dashboard, but can be 
obtained by request, as it was for this report. It is worth pointing out here that none of the annual reports on 
procurement and/or MWESB utilization from Multnomah County, Metro, the State of Oregon or the City of 
Portland contain the complete data tables, scrubbed of any information that could be used to identify 
workers.  
 
Posey proposes several solutions to the problem of obtaining clear and correct data from governments who 
are engaged in minority contracting. These recommendations will be discussed more after a deeper review of 
the existing literature but they include front-end electronic data collection, frequent audits, “online real time 
transparency websites” and independent community oversight.  
 
These contributions follow a theme that has existed in writings on racial equity and racial disparities that 
Curry-Stevens and the Coalition of Communities of Color have partnered on for the last seven years. 
Numerous data systems have generated profiles of systems outcomes that have obscured the details of the 
experiences of communities of color. Referred to as the “whiteness bias,” these representations have either 
failed to reveal data, amalgamated categories so that we cannot see what has happened to various 
communities of color, and neglected routine investigations of racial disparities in public services.15 It is time 
to ensure that data is revealed accurately, routinely and transparently. Only with such practices can the trust 
of communities of color be earned. And such information must lead to improvements in accountability 
practices such that troubling patterns of inequities can be effectively remedied.  
 
At the same time, it is important to address the discourse regarding race-conscious contracting: we believe 
that public agencies hold some fear over the backlash and potential litigation from white contractors that 
might flow from becoming more public about their equity initiatives. We think this is a contributing factor in 
the lack of transparency on reporting racial outcomes. What might seem like a “no win” situation for public 
contractors – being criticized for not meeting their equity goals, and being criticized by those who think such 
goals should not exist in the first place – is really an extension of the damage of racism and its corollary of 
white privilege. We ponder the privilege involved for white contractors to believe that they are more entitled 
to government contracts than minority contractors! We encourage all levels of government to join in an 
effort to improve and expand the discourse on racial equity. In today’s political landscape of civil unrest in 
the face of inequities, we believe it is an initiative that cannot be left untended. 
 
Attaining this discourse goal and that of data transparency is best done in real partnership with leaders of 
color who have lived experiences of the shortcomings of current policies and procedures.  
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A Review of Available Literature  
Establishing Best Practices in Minority Contracting 
While there is a lot written on government contracting, there is less research that is specifically focused on 
the issue of contracting to minority-owned businesses.  Lohrentz et al  conducted a large, nationwide study 
of 40 jurisdictions (cities and counties) that identified several best practices for minority contracting and  
their conclusions echo themes that emerge in other studies as well  (Bates, 2005; Sweet, 2006; Curry-Stevens 
et al, 2010; Shaw, 2010; Jaja, 2013; Office of Inspector General, 2013; Flynn, 2014).  
 
Lohrentz et al (2014) identified 7 best practices for successful programs, defining success as “policies and 
practices that tent to increase jobs in diverse, low-income communities and enhance regional asset 
distribution” (p.7). Those practices are:  
1. Set specific sub-contracting goals and benchmarks 
2. Help MWBE firms grow from sub-contractors to prime contractors 
3. Work within local political realities and legal requirements 
4. Eliminate discrimination at every stage of the procurement process 
5. Build in comprehensive strategies to ensure effectiveness of race-neutral programs 
6. Set aggressive procurement goals to expand opportunities 
7. Encourage micro-enterprise development through contract scale adjustments and set-asides16 
 
Several of these practices are substantiated elsewhere in the literature. Sweet (2006), in attempting to 
empirically assess the efficacy of minority-contracting programs in the U.S.,  notes that “Those who have 
studied MBE programs empirically rarely explicitly addressed the issue of goals of such programs, but instead 
have implicitly attributed goals to them” (p.167). Flynn's (2014) audit of the Metro MWESB program 
chronicles conflicts between active and passive goals that make it hard to identify what the desired outcomes 
of the Metro MWESB program would be. She writes, “Differences in the language used to describe goals 
were sometimes subtle, but had a large impact on setting expectations for the program among Metro 
employees and program participants” (p.12). Lohrentz et al (2014) identify “policies that set clear goals to 
address specific disparities and barriers” as one part of the equation, adding that jurisdictions with clear 
goals also “support one reporting agency and coordinated program implementation in all relevant city 
departments” (p.7).  
 
Streamlined collection and reporting of clear data is a resounding theme in the literature. Curry-Stevens et al 
(2010) pointed out problems in acquiring disaggregated data so that accurate comparisons could be made 
and the progress of minority-owned businesses could be tracked from year to year. Shaw (2010) predicts 
Posey's concerns (2014) about incomplete and misleading data when she writes, “Theoretically, all 
contracting and procurement information is available, but in practice, information can be inaccurate and 
misleading” (p.19). The 2014 Metro audit by Flynn notes that “management and staff were unable to identify 
how the measures were calculated” in asserting that “Metro needs consistent and reliable information to 
determine whether it is reaching its MWESB goals” (p.9). Jaja (2013) proposes the use of real-time tracking 
and reporting software (such as ePrismSoft) that would effectively create a “scoreboard” by which the public 
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could see and respond to the actions of both government contracting entities and the businesses to whom 
they award contracts.  
 
As to the best practices of helping minority-owned firms grow from sub-contractors to primary contractors 
and setting aggressive goals to grow opportunity, Bates and Williams (1995) identified three practices that 
“actually do promote the longevity of MBE vendors:  
1. The presence of a rigorous certification process is positively associated with heightened MBE vendor 
survival prospects, and the presence of a staff assigned to assist minority firms produces the same 
result.  
2. MBE vendors located in areas where bonding requirements are routinely waived for procurement 
contracts (or bonding is actually provided by the locality) are much more likely to remain in business, 
other things equal, than firms in other areas 
3. MBE vendors located in areas where the local government provides working capital assistance to 
contract recipients are more likely to remain in operation, other factors constant, than firms in other 
areas” (p.16-17).  
 
Shaw (2010) documents the potential for “fraud and scandal” in contracting, and the primary form of fraud 
documented in the literature is known as fronting (18). Front firms are nominally MWESB firms that are often 
hastily thrown together in order to secure a preferential contract that is actually executed (and therefore 
actually benefits) a larger, non-MWESB firm. Bates and Williams (1995) documented the fronting 
phenomenon (a concern also raised by James Posey) and were blunt in their assessment: “MBE front 
company abuses can be held down by penalizing such activity heavily” (p.21). They went on to suggest that 
on-site compliance reviews could serve as easy detection systems for front companies.  
 
Policies to Support and Expand Minority Hiring and Local Hiring  
Of equivalent, or possibly greater, importance to who receives public contracts is who gets paid to work on 
them. Local governments and community-based actors have developed a variety of tools to ensure that the 
benefits of publicly-funded job creation – whether through economic development incentives or public 
works projects – are directed toward communities of need, especially those experiencing elevated poverty 
and institutional barriers to opportunity, such as racial minorities.  In addition to promoting more equitable 
outcomes, such policies can also have broader economic benefits for communities.  Labor economists like 
Tim Bartik of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research have argued that “demand side” policies that 
target employment opportunities toward long-term unemployed and underemployed populations can have 
long run benefits for labor force participation and earnings, and enhance the social return on public 
investment in economic development projects (Bartik, 2001; 2007).17     
  
Why are such policies necessary? 
Without policy interventions, the labor market on its own is unlikely to ensure diverse, equitable hiring on 
public construction projects. There are several reasons for this, including:  
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• Education and skill gaps: Individuals from disadvantaged communities often experience both lower 
educational quality and worse educational outcomes, leading to basic skill deficits in the workforce. 
These deficits contribute to difficulty obtaining living-wage positions offering opportunities for skill 
development and career advancement. This ultimately compounds the disadvantages facing those 
communities.         
• Informal networks and “workplace culture”: Workers often find out about jobs, and employers find out 
about workers, through informal networks that are often reflective of who already is employed and 
therefore “in the know.” This perpetuates the disadvantage that underrepresented groups such as racial 
minorities and women experience, both because they do not find out about opportunities, and benefit 
less from informal mentoring on the job, increasing the likelihood of attrition if workers do not feel 
welcomed on the worksite.18     
• Institutional racism: Ostensibly race- or gender-neutral policies can have disparate impacts on different 
population segments. For example, procedures that require new apprentices to travel long distances 
initially for less-desirable jobs to “get off the bench” may have greater negative impacts on workers with 
limited capacity to undertake travel, such as single parents or economically disadvantaged persons, 
which may perpetuate disparities by race and/or gender. While “fair” on their face, such policies can 
reinforce existing advantages and disadvantages, perpetuating disparity and inequity.        
 
Demand-side tools are an important complement to supply-side approaches, such as pre-apprenticeship 
programs, which aim to increase the pool of workers from disadvantaged and underrepresented 
communities19. However, these tools alone are often insufficient unless they are coupled with policies that 
incent employers to take advantage of their availability.  A recent study by the UCLA Labor Center of 33 
public construction projects in Seattle found that African American workers made up only 3% of the hours 
worked, despite comprising nearly 8% of the city’s population,20 even though the Seattle region has an 
extensive network of construction pre-apprenticeship programs.21   
 
What tools exist for overcoming these barriers? 
Several options exist for promoting the hiring of workers of color and for hiring local workers. While the 
priority of hiring local workers does not explicitly aim to hire workers of color, it has an impact that can affect 
workers of color. First, when enacted in a comparatively diverse region, it increases the likelihood that 
workers of color will be hired over lesser diverse workers in neighboring jurisdictions (as will be 
demonstrated in the Sellwood Bridge case study that follows). Second, when local communities receive 
economic investments (as local hiring practices create), the benefits are retained in the larger community 
which cannot help but spill into overall economic conditions, employment rates and the wage floor which 
holds potential to improve wages across the community.  
 
In the following text, we demonstrate the viability of four tools for improving the employment conditions of 
workers of color: first source hiring policies, local hiring policies, community benefits agreements, and 
project labor agreements.  
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• First source hiring policies require employers receiving public subsidies or contracts to utilize a 
designated workforce agency or intermediary on a preferential basis. This usually means the 
establishment of a defined window of time in which those agencies, or referrals from those agencies, are 
given “first chance” to fill available positions.  The City of Portland was the first U.S. city to adopt a First 
Source Hiring policy back in 1978, requiring all economic development incentive recipients to work with 
publicly-funded employment and training programs for hiring, and often the creation of customized 
training programs to help prepare individuals for those jobs. In the 1980s First Source requirements were 
extended to the State of Oregon’s economic development programs, including enterprise zones (EZ) and 
lottery-funded programs, and in the 1990s the Portland Development Commission (PDC) used the 
“JobNet” program to help target employment toward residents of the North/Northeast Portland 
community. First Source Hiring Agreements are still required by PDC and Business Oregon for EZ and 
certain other incentive programs, but presently this entails requiring employers to list available 
employment opportunities with the Worksource Oregon system.  Since First Source policies cannot 
obligate employers to hire individuals referred by those agencies, the efficacy of such policies is largely 
dependent on the quality of the intermediary and the degree of activity of the relationship with the 
employer.        
 
• Local hire policies are similar to first source policies, but instead specify that employers/contractors must 
achieve a specified participation of workers from a defined geography, usually the public jurisdiction 
granting the contract or subsidy.  Local hire requirements have been subject to considerable legal 
challenges over the years, with courts generally holding that such requirements on economic 
development incentive recipients are not constitutional due to their infringement of individuals’ 
“privileges and immunities” to work across jurisdictions.  However, courts have been more open to the 
establishment of local hire requirements in public contracting, especially if the source of funding is state 
or local, rather than federal.  Federal agencies such as the Federal Highway Administration explicitly 
prohibit local recipients from establishing local hire goals or targets on their projects, which fund the vast 
majority of transportation-related projects in the United States22. Boston’s Resident Jobs Policy is a good 
example of a local hire policy23; it stipulates that 50% of hours worked on City-funded construction 
projects must be by city residents, 25% by racial minorities, and 10% by women. In practice, however, 
local governments have been somewhat reticent to enforce local hire requirements for fear of provoking 
further legal challenges.     
 
• Community benefits agreements (CBA) are negotiated contracts between a project developer and a 
consortium of community representatives, typically with the direct or indirect participation of public 
agencies financially or legally involved in the project.24 CBAs are designed to maximize beneficial impacts 
of projects on communities, especially disadvantaged communities, by obligating developers to 
contribute toward measures, such as affordable housing or parks construction, which offset potential 
negative impacts such as displacement or congestion. At the same time, CBAs often include provisions 
that require for hiring of local residents and/or residents from disadvantaged populations during the 
construction phase (often in conjunction with project labor agreements, discussed below) and for 
“permanent” jobs in cases of commercial developments. CBAs emerged in the 2000s in Los Angeles 
around projects like the LA Live/Staples Center redevelopment project, and have been adopted in a 
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number of cities throughout the U.S.  Because they are negotiated agreements between private 
developers and community coalitions, rather than governmental policies, CBAs are often better 
positioned to include local hiring provisions, and provisions for racial diversity, which are forbidden in 
several states, including California and Washington State. However, the efficacy of CBAs as a social and 
racial equity tool depends greatly on the capacity and willingness of community representatives and 
public agencies to monitor and enforce the provisions agreed to by developers.       
 
• Project labor agreements with community workforce provisions are similar to CBAs in that they specify 
targeting goals and procedures, except that they require labor unions to formally agree to stipulations 
that support local workforce conditions. A Project Labor Agreement (or PLA) is a negotiated contract 
between project owners and a consortium of labor unions to establish protocols for a specific building 
project on variety of issues relating to working conditions, dispute resolution and hiring.25 Many major 
construction projects, public and private, in Oregon involve PLAs, which help to mitigate labor-
management conflict and ensure timely completion. In some cases, PLAs are completed on an agency-
wide or “master” basis, applying to all projects of a particular size. It is important to note that PLAs are 
not inherently designed to promote equity and inclusion, especially in terms of minority contracting,26 
and without strong community workforce provisions, are often part of the problem to the extent that 
they enforce the use of union hiring procedures that have perpetuated disparities and 
underrepresentation. However, PLAs can be a useful vehicle for community workforce provisions that 
achieve targeting goals. Apprentice utilization rates are a common provision of PLAs, but they can go 
further, to specify goals for women and racial minority workforce participation, local hiring outcomes, 
and even hiring priority from designated pre-apprenticeship programs (called “direct” or “preferred 
entry” provisions). As with CBAs, their value is greatest where transparency and accountability are 
achieved, through oversight committees where community representatives, construction trade unions, 
contractors and public agencies/owners can review and scrutinize project outcomes. But since public 
agencies are not signatories to PLAs, they have limited tools to enforce community workforce provisions 
within those agreements.         
  
Each of these tools provides important levers to enhance conditions for minority owned businesses and for 
workers of color. That said, and as will be demonstrated in the case study that follows, an unenforced policy 
is worse than no policy at all, because policies provide the semblance of progress where none exists, and 
they raise expectations for workers that are not going to materialize. The net result is that we are left with a 
local landscape that looks promising but that requires reports such as these to investigate and decipher.   
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Case Study: The Sellwood Bridge Project 
In summer 2012, construction began on a replacement for the Sellwood Bridge (SWB) in southeast Portland. 
Multnomah County, which owns the bridge and is overseeing the project, awarded the construction contract 
to Slayden-Sundt JV, a joint venture between Slayden Construction of Slayton, Oregon (Marion County) and 
Sundt of Tempe, Arizona. As of January 2015, construction is more than two-thirds complete on the 
replacement bridge, which is scheduled to open in early 2016.    
 
Multnomah County and Slayden-Sundt have made diversity a prominent part of their public relations 
strategy for the SWB project.  In its Diversity Plan approved by Multnomah County in September 201127, 
Slayden-Sundt laid out a series of quantitative benchmarks for contractor and workforce diversity, including:     
• 20% of total construction contract value to Disadvantaged, Minority, Women and Emerging Small 
Business (DMWESB) contractors; 
• 20% of labor hours for each apprenticeable trade on large subcontracts to be performed by state 
registered apprentices28; 
• “Aspirational” goals of 20% of hours worked by racial minorities and 14% by women.   
 
In addition, Slayden-Sundt committed to a variety of outreach, technical assistance, and capacity building 
efforts that are common to such projects. 
 
How well is the SWB project achieving its goals? We obtained data from Multnomah County regarding 
contractor and workforce outcomes, updated through September 2014.  Our analysis identifies a series of 
shortcomings with the contracting and employment outcomes from the SWB project. We have organized 
these findings into two categories: contracting and workforce, and provided summary statements as to our 
insights of these data, along with justification for these insights.    
Contracting Findings  
Here we detail shortcomings of the contracting goals, disaggregated to identify the progress achieved by 
minority owned businesses, and the total investments into these businesses. 
  
a. As of September 2014, the SWB project was short of its 20% DMWESB contracting goal. 
The Sellwood Bridge project has struggled to approach its DMWESB goal of 20% participation.  As of last 
September, they stood at 16.4% - $35.7 million of $217.4 million total – contracted to DMWESBs. Although 
this represents an increase from one year earlier, when they stood at less than 13%, they are still nearly $8 
million below the level necessary to reach their diversity contracting target29. 
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Sellwood Bridge Project (SWB) contractor data, obtained from Multnomah County. 
 
b. State-certified minority business enterprises represent roughly 11% of SWB contract totals.        
It is critical to break down the broad category of DMWESB contractors into the three overlapping categories 
of minority, women and “emerging small businesses” (i.e., recently-started businesses). Using data from the 
State’s Oregon Minority, Women and Emerging Small Business (OMWESB) database30, we coded SWB 
contractors based on the categories for which they are certified. State-registered Minority Business 
Enterprises (MBEs) represent 10.7% of total contracts (Figure 1), totaling $23.3 million. By comparison, 4.6% 
($9.9 million) of total contracts have gone to non-minority, Women-owned businesses (WBE), while 1.1% 
($2.5 million) have gone to ESBs not certified as either minority- or women-owned.     
 
The contract share allocated to federally-qualified DBE contractors varies greatly across the three categories. 
Among MBEs, 60% of the total contracts went to DBEs, with 40% going to larger, established businesses no 
longer eligible for DBE status. Among WBEs not registered as MBEs, only 31% of contract totals went to 
DBEs31, and among remaining ESBs (12 contracts totaling $2.5 million), none were certified DBEs.  Overall, 
DBE contractors represented less than half (48%) of the DMWESB total, suggesting that smaller, less 
established MBEs are not benefitting as much.  
 
c. Minority-owned businesses are engaged on smaller contracts than non-MBEs.  
A total of 55 contracts worth $23.3 million have gone to 40 minority-owned businesses for the SWB project, 
for an average contract size of $424,168.  This is significantly smaller than the average non-prime (i.e., other 
than Slayden-Sundt) contract size of nearly $600,000.  For DBE-eligible MBEs the average contract is much 
lower, at $167,201. Among African-American contractors, the average contract for DBE-eligible firms (18 
firms, 26 contracts) is slightly higher ($297,011) than the MBE average32, while much lower for Asian-
American (4 firms, 4 contracts, $138,302) and Hispanic-owned MBEs (12 firms, 12 contracts, $83,258).  This 
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(83.6%)
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suggests that MBEs are engaged primarily on small subcontracts with fewer opportunities to gain experience 
and build wealth.     
 
Workforce Findings 
Workforce measures are typically reported by the numbers of hours worked by each community, and the 
second is to add additional complexities to these hours worked, such as wages earned and types of 
employment. We then wanted to dig a little deeper into an assessment of the degree to which using minority 
contractors actually generates solid employment for workers of color.  
 
a. So far, the SWB project is exceeding its 20% aspirational goal for minority workforce participation.  
The total employment figures are positive, with communities of color accessing 28.8% of the work hours 
expended on the SWB project, as of the early fall of 2014. Figure 9 below shows that while this is laudable, it 
is a relatively similar level as the overall Multnomah County workforce data, which has workers of color at 
26.0% of the workforce. This shows that overall access to employment has been well-addressed such that 
workers of color enter the jobs in the SWB project at levels equivalent to their workforce population. 
 
It is, however, possible that employers who are expected to hire workers of color do so on a temporary basis 
or do so at such few hours of employment as to compel us to look, instead, at hours of work to discern more 
durable benefits of these public expenditures. As of September 2014, nearly 30% of the hours worked on the 
SWB project were by persons of color (POC), exceeding the 20% aspirational goal for racial diversity (Figure 
9). Among racial/ethnic groups, Hispanic workers represented the largest share, with over 12% of hours 
worked, followed by African-Americans (9%), Native Americans (5%), and Asian/Pacific Islanders (2.3%). This 
compares favorably to the racial diversity of the adult workforce in Multnomah County, with the exception of 
Asian/Pacific Islanders, who are significantly underrepresented relative to their population share.   
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Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County. Multnomah County 
workforce data based on authors’ analysis of 2011-13 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Series. 
 
b. This aggregate total, however, masks wide disparities in the quality of jobs held by Whites and by 
Persons of Color, especially African Americans. 
There is a significant wage gap for White workers and workers of color on the SWB project. The average 
wage for White workers was nearly $32 per hour, compared to $27.55 for workers of color – a gap of nearly 
14% (Figure 10). For African Americans the gap is even greater, with an average wage of only $22.34 – nearly 
$10 less per hour than White workers.  
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Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County. Multnomah County 
workforce data based on authors’ analysis of 2011-13 American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Series. 
 
 
The primary reason for this gap is because persons of color are concentrated in lower-paid trades such as 
Flaggers and other Laborers, and with some exceptions, underrepresented in higher-paid trades (Figure 11). 
For example, Persons of Color worked three-fourths of all hours in Flagging – the lowest-paid position at an 
average journey-level wage of approximately $21 per hour – and nearly 40% of other Laborer hours 
($27/hour), but only 11% of Operators ($34/hour) and 18% of Pilebucks.  Amazingly, nearly two out of three 
hours worked by African-Americans were as Flaggers.  
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Source: Authors’ analysis of SWB project workforce data, obtained from Multnomah County. 
 
One of the few bright spots among higher-paid trades are the Ironworkers, for which 63% of the hours 
worked on the SWB project have been Persons of Color. However, closer analysis shows that this has been 
almost entirely attributable to Latino workers; there were no hours worked by African-Americans in this 
trade. This suggest that some trades may be making inroads within certain communities of color, but not all.  
 
c. Minority-owned businesses show a higher rate of minority workforce utilization than White-owned 
businesses.   
Over half (56%) of hours worked by minority-owned businesses were by Persons of Color, compared to only 
23% for White-owned businesses.  To some extent this gap is skewed by two minority-owned flagging 
businesses; excluding these two, minority workforce utilization is somewhat lower (38%), but still nearly two-
thirds higher than White-owned businesses.  This reflects the tendency for MBEs to be concentrated in 
lower-paid, manual labor fields, but it also suggests that majority-owned firms – and the trade unions they 
draw workers from – are less successful in connecting with diverse communities in their recruitment and 
hiring.     
 
d. Multnomah County workers on the SWB project are more diverse than the regional figures, but 
represent only one-quarter of hours worked and approximately one-fifth of earnings. 
One factor hindering workforce diversity on the SWB project is the relatively low utilization of workers from 
within Multnomah County, who tend to be more racially diverse.  Less than one-quarter of hours worked 
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(24%) and roughly one-fifth (20.7%) of earnings went to Multnomah County workers. By contrast, Clackamas 
County workers have garnered nearly one in six hours (16%) on the project, followed by Clark County 
(Washington) at 13%.  Workers drawn from within Multnomah County were much more racially diverse, with 
53% persons of color compared to 21% of workers from elsewhere.  The low utilization of Multnomah County 
workers stands in stark contrast to the funding for the project, of which over three-fourths (78%) comes from 
the City of Portland and Multnomah County taxpayers.33 However, because the SWB project is funded in 
small part through federal monies, they have been unable to incorporate local hiring goals. Yet in the 
absence of such goals, we can see that the vast majority of the work will go to residents of other jurisdictions, 
reducing both the public return on investment and opportunities to benefit communities of color.  
 
A full set of data tables is included in the Appendix. 
 
Summary 
The Sellwood Bridge Project shows the critical importance of digging deeper into the data to see what is 
happening with contracting and hiring on large public construction projects.  Top-level goals for DMWESB 
and minority workforce utilization can mask as much as they reveal.  For example, it shows that state-
certified minority-owned businesses have gotten only 11% of the contracts for the project, less than half of 
total DMWESB contracts have gone to disadvantaged businesses, and that MBE contracts tend to be, on 
average, much smaller than those of majority-owned businesses. And while the project has more than met 
its 20% goal for workforce racial diversity, it is clear that Persons of Color – African-Americans in particular – 
are locked into the lowest-paid trades with the fewest opportunities for upward mobility. As a result, far less 
of the material benefits – in terms of income and wealth – are flowing back to communities of color within 
Multnomah County. 
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Recommendations  
Five categories of recommendations are advanced in this report: (1) regional strategies, (2) accountability 
and data systems, (3) innovations, (4) incentives and sanctions, and (5) discourse and awareness efforts. 
These surface from our investigation of practices at the State, County, City and Metro levels, and specifically 
investigated in the Sellwood Bridge Project. Our recommendations are rooted in the evidence of 
shortcomings with the minority contracting policies and practices. We remain enthusiastic about the 
potential for the program, particularly as shown in the literature. Given the ability of successful minority 
contracting programs to increase wealth in communities of color, mitigate the impacts of historical 
discrimination, and support a more even distribution of income and assets within regional economies, we 
find it essential to work with policy makers at multiple levels to advance improvements to the MWESB 
minority owned business contracting system.  
Regional Strategy  
Our central recommendation is to implement a regional strategy to provide work opportunities for minority 
contractors (Lohrentz et al, 2014). This strategy should require active participation of all departments and 
agencies, include clear goals and benchmarks, provide assistance in navigating the MWESB certification 
process, and employ streamlined methods of data collection and reporting that are clear, accountable, and 
accessible to the public in real time. A program such as ePrismSoft could be utilized to collect and publish 
such data and it could be published in the form of an online “scoreboard” to guarantee transparency and 
measure progress (Jaja, 2013). Lohrentz et al also recommend creating or designating “one reporting agency 
for the whole city or county, as is done in jurisdictions such as New York City, Philadelphia, Houston and 
Baltimore” (p.33).  
 
The development of a regional strategy should include multiple levels of government, and establishing 
standards which need to be adhered to across departments and regions. The State of Oregon should convene 
these tables, include leading community experts on this topic (we can provide a list of suggested experts), 
and should come to the table with an attitude of humility that reflects its own deeply flawed outcomes. 
While the State is an appropriate convening group, it has much to learn about effective contracting practices 
and accountability measures.  
 
We add a stronger vision to this regional strategy about the establishment of targets for both minority 
contractors as well as workforce hiring. We believe it is time to embark on serious conversation about need, 
for some communities have stronger needs than others. 
 
It is time to let ourselves be informed by needs – on the basis of the size of the population, and considering a 
metric that is not tied to available workers, but rather by the population itself, and give us higher aspirations 
to ensure that more people of color become prepared for and eligible for work in sectors where public 
investments are being made. So too we need to consider the profile of the unemployed population – which 
surfaces where the need for employment is greatest. We reproduce these data below to begin to catalyze 
thinking about appropriate targets for hiring workers of color and for minority contracting.  
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Source: American Community Survey, 2006-2010. Please note that this larger time span allows the Census Bureau 
(who publish these data) to share information on smaller communities, such as Pacific Islanders. 
 
Figure 12, above, suggests that there should perhaps be more robust metrics used to set appropriate targets 
for workforce hiring. If we were to use these metrics, the performance of the SWB project would remain 
positive, but not surpassing targets in the same magnitude.  
 
  
Source: American Community Survey, varying years. We opted to use more current figures when available for most 
communities so they better reflected current economic conditions. The years of data are detailed in the figure.  
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Please notice that we are not saying that these need to be targets or metrics to assess success; rather, we 
invite policy makers and stakeholders to consider that “need” could factor into the establishment of targets 
in more effective ways. We hope to be invited to these policy tables to share our perspectives and open 
dialogue about the importance of wrapping issues of need into targets, anticipating that these would include 
population levels, unemployment rates, poverty rates, “hard to employ” populations, geographic areas 
where needs are highest, and sectors where communities of color have been unable to penetrate barriers to 
the profession.  
Accountability and Data Systems 
a. Standardized policy frameworks 
At the top of our list is the need to develop policy frameworks that ensure that data on the status of 
minority contracting is shared routinely, accurately, and transparently. Using the same system and 
outcome metrics across jurisdictions is recommended so that results are comparable and so that the 
community is able to effectively discern progress and challenges.  
b. Reporting details expanded 
Greater detail in reporting is important to ensure that we can understand the effectiveness in minority 
contracting in different communities. Disaggregating expectations should follow the requirements of 
House Bill 2134, which currently applies only to the Oregon Health Authority and the Department of 
Human Services and those with who they contract and subcontract.34 It is expected that similar 
legislation will increasingly spread to other departments in the coming years.  
c. Worker level details expanded 
We also want to ensure that we can separate workforce activities for apprentice and journey-level 
workers. We would like to discern the degree to which apprentice opportunities are (a) completed, and 
(b) lead to well-paying jobs. We simultaneously want to ensure that the bulk of employment hours for 
workers of color serve to expand their future employment opportunities, equivalently with those 
available to white workers. Dead-end jobs do not well serve communities of color. The type of 
occupational segregation uncovered in the Sellwood Bridge Project necessitates a cohesive approach to 
both monitoring and remedy. We urge the exploration of establishing a trade-specific lens on its barriers 
to recruitment, retention and promotion of workers, as well as robust and transparent commitments to 
eradicating inequities. This would ideally be aligned with strong government expectations for achieving 
trade-specific employment equity, and to disclosing these intentions and outcomes publicly.  
d. Inclusion forecasting 
Government organizations who are serious about addressing equity could also engage in long-term 
inclusion forecasting – that is, implementing a process whereby future projects are examined to identify 
potential inclusion opportunities. In fact, local policymakers could lead efforts to establish a 
comprehensive economic development plan focused on providing access to the full range of 
procurement processes, including new infrastructure funding.  
e. Independent audits 
We also need regular independent audits of projects to guarantee proper collection and reporting of 
data. It is important that data be reliable and effective; too often our own research had questions about 
accuracy of data and sometimes questions surfaced about the degree to which undesirable patterns 
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might have been intentionally obscured. Audits would both eliminate our concerns as well as promoting 
greater accuracy by firms and by project managers.  
Innovations 
a. Pathways to advancement 
The identification of the prevalence of employment of workers of color as flaggers is obviously troubling. 
We would like to see partnerships between governments and contractors to support the employment 
opportunities for low-end workers, and the establishment of recognized and supported pathways to 
advancement. These can be accompanied by a combination of incentives (where pathways are 
successful) and sanctions (where pathways are not made available for workers). An additional idea is to 
expand partnerships across sectors: if union apprenticeship programs in higher paid fields could recruit 
from lower paid fields like laborers and flaggers, which tend to be more diverse, we could bridge workers 
of color to higher paid jobs. We would also expand this idea in pre-apprenticeship programs, again which 
tend to be more diverse.  
b. Moratorium on low-bid selection process 
Another significant recommendation is for organizations to provide a moratorium on the low-bid process 
in favor of a negotiated or best-value bid arrangement. This would allow diversity/inclusion to feature 
more prominently as factors in the selection process (see Jaja, 2013 and Lohrentz et al, 2014).  
c. Expanded role of equity in bid selection process  
To replace the low-bid selection process, we recommend that additional features be included in the 
decision-making practices of awarding contracts. These features should include the contractors’ past 
minority and local hiring performance (ideally that has been validated by public agencies), expectations 
for enhanced hiring of workers of color, improved opportunities for lower-end workers, and penalties for 
failed promises in past contracts. While some language exists for similar criteria to be considered, it is 
generally believed that equity criteria are rarely integrated into decision-making.  
d. Expand local and first source hiring 
We need to strengthen first source and local hiring policies, and community workforce provisions within 
Project Labor Agreements on public construction projects. While we endorse heightened expectations in 
both these areas (to hire locally and to hold requirements to hire workers of color), we repeat our 
assertion that an unenforced policy is worse than no policy at all; these policies simply must be 
enforceable.   
Incentives and Sanctions 
a. Wage reimbursement for priority communities 
An incentive program modeled on the current Workforce Training program (which reimburses $20.00 per 
hour for every apprenticeship hour worked up to 10,000 hours), should be implemented. Additional 
reimbursements could be possible for primary contractors whose apprenticeship hours are worked by 
African Americans or Asian Americans (two of the most underrepresented workforce groups based on 
the disparity study). Such an incentive program could be utilized in conjunction with the Oregon 
Department of Transportation's Mentor/Protégé program, allowing primary contractors to recoup 
additional expenses with helping to develop and train a minority-owned firm. The use of mentor/protégé 
programs is identified by Lohrentz et al (2014) as a “promising practice” in capacity building that is 
currently used in Charlotte and Houston (p.35). To protect against the fraud Bates and Williams (1995) 
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warn of, the program should require prime contractors to clearly identify the MBE firm and the specific 
type of work that is to be performed. This should go through an approval process that not only includes 
ODOT representation but also minority contracting representation in order to validate the legitimacy of 
the relationship (thus guarding against the practice of fronting) and that the relationship can deliver on 
the goal of building capacity and expertise in the minority contracting community.  
b. Serious sanctions for failed diversity histories  
Businesses that receive awards with promises or expectations that they will hire workers of color, and 
subsequently do not make such hires need to face sanctions. So too do unions that create roadblocks to 
diversity in hiring. While the reach of such sanctions needs to be determined, it is important to provide 
sanctioning capacity for governments who award minority contracts. These sanctions should consider a 
wide range of options, up to and including disbarment from certification for repeated low performance.   
Discourse and Awareness Efforts  
a. It is time for public agencies to work across jurisdictions and to partner with community advocates and 
bring forward both the ethics of racial equity (and the injustices of racial inequities) and the social and 
economic imperative for expanding their role in addressing racial disparities. We see this as important for 
eliminating the concerns that many in public agencies hold in being transparent about their equity 
initiatives. It is essential for our collective future for everyone in the region to have real opportunities for 
a positive future; a vision that will simultaneously improve our standing in national rankings of prosperity 
and in international rankings of human development.   
 
Conclusion 
Our journey through this research has been intriguing and illuminating. We have used our review of the 
literature, of the results gained by various jurisdictions, and our deep dive into the outcomes of the Sellwood 
Bridge Project to draw a tight conclusion: the promise of minority contracting remains intact, but the net 
impacts on workers of color, and communities that benefit from the investments of public dollars has not 
been realized to anywhere near their full potential. Improvements to this situation is essential, and we hope 
that our public sector leaders understand the depths of the work needed to turn the promise into much 
more solid outcomes.  
 
Our priorities for action are multifaceted: (1) build effective data systems that track progress in accurate, 
timely and transparent ways, (2) establish targets in more relevant ways so that “need” features as a higher 
priority, (3) create a robust accountability structure that integrates use of effective incentives and sanctions, 
(4) integrate viable innovations that promote stronger worker and community wellbeing, and (5) work 
regionally to establish enhanced capacity to reach the promise of minority contracting. 
 
We look forward to seeing these ideas integrated within policy dialogues and to seeing the potential for 
minority contracting to come to fruition.    
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Appendix: Sellwood Bridge (SWB) Project Contractor and Workforce Diversity 
Analysis Tables 
 
Table 1a      
Total SWB contracts and subcontracts by DMWESB status   
      
  November 2013   September 2014   
  Contracted % of total Contracted % of total 
Non-DMWESB firms $192,941,868 91.2% $189,700,677 87.3% 
DMWESB firms $18,705,520 8.8% $27,694,405 12.7% 
MBE $11,482,188 5.4% $15,083,670 6.9% 
WBE (Non-MBE) $5,387,226 2.5% $9,898,470 4.6% 
DBE/ESB (Non-MBE/WBE) $1,836,106 0.9% $2,273,320 1.0% 
Total $211,647,388   $217,395,083   
  
Table 1b     
Total SWB contracts and subcontracts by Owner Race/Ethnicity   
     
  November 2013   September 2014   
  Contracted % of total Contracted % of total 
White/Caucasian* $194,024,141 91.7% $194,065,827 89.3% 
African-American $11,870,788 5.6% $15,737,574 7.2% 
Native American $4,911,861 2.3% $6,039,373 2.8% 
Hispanic $585,933 0.3% $999,099 0.5% 
Asian-American** $254,655 0.1% $553,209 0.3% 
Total $211,647,378 100% $217,395,083 100% 
Minority contractors, total $17,623,237 8.3% $23,329,255 10.7% 
     
* Businesses not listed in OMWESB database assumed to be White/Caucasian.   
** includes South Asian and Asian-Pacific categories    
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Table 1c 
Total SWB contracts, awarded versus paid, by Owner Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014 
    
  September 2014   Paid as % of 
Awarded   Awarded Paid 
White $194,065,827 $130,729,947 67% 
African-American $15,737,574 $4,220,207 27% 
Native American $6,039,373 $4,152,291 69% 
Hispanic $999,099 $475,532 48% 
Asian-American $553,209 $185,283 33% 
Total $217,395,083 $139,763,260 64% 
Minority contractors, total $23,329,255 $9,033,313 39% 
 
 
 
Table 1d     
Total SWB non-prime contracts by Owner Race/Ethnicity and DMWESB status  
     
Owner Race/Ethnicity Firms Contracts Awarded Average Contract 
White 109 152 $100,121,586 $658,695 
African-American 18 27 $15,737,574 $582,873 
Native American 6 12 $6,039,373 $503,281 
Hispanic 12 12 $999,099 $83,258 
Asian-American 4 4 $553,209 $138,302 
Total 149 207 $123,450,842 $596,381 
Minority contractors, total 40 55 $23,329,255 $424,168 
     
By DMWESB status Firms Contracts Awarded Average Contract 
MBE contractors 39 54 $15,083,670 $279,327 
MBE/DBE contractors 34 48 $8,025,668 $167,201 
All DBE contractors 55 77 $11,485,060 $149,157 
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Table 1e 
Largest SWB Minority Contractors      
      
Contractor Location 
Owner 
Race/Ethnicity 
# of 
Contracts Net Contracted 
Net Paid as 
of Sept 2014 
Carr Construction* Portland African-American 1 $8,015,291 $313,271 
McDonald Excavating 
Washougal, 
WA Native American 1 $3,876,670 $2,735,517 
O'Neill Electric Portland African-American 2 $2,867,564 $13,509 
Pacificmark Construction 
Corp. Milwaukie African-American 
3 
$1,739,581 $1,326,453 
PTS Surveying Hillsboro Native American 1 $1,014,970 $835,597 
Munitor Construction Newberg Native American 1 $1,007,793 $439,020 
Tri-Star Flagging Oregon City African-American 1 $996,212 $836,126 
Meko Construction** 
Woodinville, 
WA African-American 2 $468,993 $456,436 
Affordable Electric Inc. Fairview African-American 2 $467,708 $416,454 
A D Traffic Control Services Portland African-American 1 $383,559 $397,071 
Northwest Infrastructure Portland African-American 3 $333,981 $201,926 
Azuri Construction, Inc. Portland Hispanic 1 $327,216 $0 
R & R General Contractors Portland Hispanic 1 $282,290 $128,733 
Green Art Landscape & 
Irrigation Hillsboro Asian-American 
1 
$254,665 $46,771 
MSD Construction Hillsboro Hispanic 2 $232,261 $163,896 
 Minority contractors, total 55 $23,329,255 $9,033,313 
 
* Not currently certified as MBE by State of Oregon, because it exceeded revenue limits. 
** Excluded from DBE/MBE calculations because it failed the “Commercially Useful Function Test” by Multnomah 
County. 
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Table 2a       
SWB Hours Worked and Earnings by Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014   
             
Race/Ethnicity Hours % of Hrs Earnings* 
% of 
Earnings 
Average 
Wage 
% of Mult Co 
workforce** 
White 282,399  71.2% $8,987,944 74.1% $31.83 74.0% 
Hispanic 49,207  12.4% $1,416,232 11.7% $28.78 10.5% 
African-American 35,878  9.0% $801,402 6.6% $22.34 4.5% 
Native American 19,776  5.0% $644,232 5.3% $32.58 0.4% 
Asian-American 9,295  2.3% $283,417 2.3% $30.49 3.4% 
Unknown 109  0.0% $3,573 0.0% $32.85  
Total     396,663  100% $12,136,801 100% $30.60 100% 
Persons of Color***, 
total     114,155  28.8% $3,145,284 25.9% $27.55 26.0% 
 
* Estimated as base hourly wage multiplied by total worker hours, as reported on Monthly Employee Utilization 
Reports (MEUR) submitted by contractors. 
** Authors' analysis of 2013 American Community Survey data for adults in the labor force. Category totals include 
individuals identifying in that racial category only, and does not include individuals identifying with more than one 
race (3.4% of labor force). 
*** Includes workers identifying as a race/ethnicity category other than White-Caucasian. 
 
 
Table 2b       
SWB Hours Worked by Trade and Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014   
       
Trade 
Average 
Journey Wage* 
Total 
Hours POC Hours 
POC% of 
Trade Hrs 
African 
American 
Hours 
Af-Am % of 
Trade Hrs 
Operator $35.10  101,768  11,108  11% 597 1% 
Pilebuck $34.24 89,647  16,234  18% 2,742 3% 
Laborer $27.58 89,062     34,096  38% 7,349 8% 
Flagger $21.32    32,458   24,427  75% 23,154 71% 
Carpenter $31.29   36,680       8,639  24% 1,184 3% 
Ironworker $35.69    25,984    16,380  63% 54 0% 
Other Trades  21,064       3,298  16% 798 4% 
Total $31.82 396,663   114,181  29% 35,878 9% 
Total, Minus Flaggers    364,204     89,754  25% 12,724 3% 
 
* Calculated as total wages divided by total hours for workers classified as non-apprentice/trainee status. 
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Table 2c      
Sellwood Bridge Project: Hours Worked by Race/Ethnicity and Apprenticeship Status   
      
Ethnicity 
Apprenticeship 
hours 
% of Apprentice 
hours 
Journey 
hours  
% of Journey 
Hours 
Apprentice % of 
Total Hours 
White/Caucasian 38,242 68% 242,043 72% 14% 
African-American 4,740 8% 31,098 9% 13% 
Hispanic 11,260 20% 37,183 11% 23% 
Asian-American 1,150 2% 8,126 2% 12% 
Native American 1,222 2% 18,555 6% 6% 
Unknown 0 0% 109 0% 0% 
Total, all workers 56,613 100% 337,112 100% 14% 
Total, Persons of Color 18,371 32% 94,961 28% 16% 
 
 
Table 2d        
SWB Apprentice Hours Worked by Trade and Race/Ethnicity, as of September 2014   
        
Trade 
Total 
Trade 
Hrs 
Total 
Apprentice 
Hrs 
Apprentice 
% of Total 
Hours 
Total POC 
Apprentice 
Hrs 
POC % of 
Trade 
Apprentice 
Hrs  
Af-Amer 
Apprent 
Hrs 
Af-Am  
% of 
Apprent Hrs 
Operator 101,768 10,771 11% 511  5% 52 1% 
Pilebuck 89,647 15,437 17% 2,832 18% 513 11% 
Laborer 89,062 13,179 15% 7,806 59% 2,214 46% 
Flagger 32,458 1,396 4% 1,138 82% 1,138 24% 
Carpenter 36,680 6,622 18% 899 14% 296 6% 
Ironworker 25,984 5,025 19% 4,401 88% 0 0% 
Other Trades 21,064 4,185 20% 1,607 38% 567 12% 
Total, all trades 396,663 56,613 14% 19,194 34% 4,780 8% 
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Table 2e         
SWB Hours Worked by Race/Ethnicity and Owner Race/Ethnicity      
         
 Contractor Race/Ethnicity        
Worker 
Race/Ethnicity White Hispanic 
African-
American 
Asian-
American 
Native 
American 
All 
contractors 
Minority 
contractors 
White/Caucasian 77% 44% 33% 67% 77% 71% 44% 
Hispanic 13% 56% 9% 22% 10% 12% 12% 
African-American 3% 0% 53% 11% 1% 9% 37% 
Asian-American 2% 0% 1% 0% 7% 2% 2% 
Native American 5% 0% 4% 0% 6% 5% 4% 
Total, all workers 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total, workers of 
color 23% 56% 67% 33% 23% 29% 56% 
 
 
Table 2f         
SWB Hours Worked by Trade and Owner Race/Ethnicity      
         
 Contractor Race/Ethnicity        
Trade White Hispanic 
African-
American 
Asian-
American 
Native 
American 
All 
contractors 
Minority 
contractors 
Operator 28% 0% 4% 23% 40% 26% 13% 
Pilebuck 27% 0% 1% 0% 0% 23% 0% 
Laborer 22% 41% 13% 76% 59% 22% 26% 
Carpenter 10% 3% 11% 0% 0% 9% 8% 
Flagger 0% 0% 66% 0% 0% 8% 47% 
Ironworker 8% 4% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0% 
Other Trades 5% 51% 5% 0% 1% 5% 7% 
Total, all trades 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 2g 
SWB Worker Hours, Earnings and Workforce Diversity by County, as of September 2014 
 
       
County/State Total Hours 
% of Total 
Hours Earnings 
% of Total 
Earnings 
POC % of 
Total Hours 
Portland Metro Total 247,862 62% $7,275,180 60% 34% 
  -Multnomah County 95,913 24% $2,506,483 21% 53% 
  -Clackamas County 62,188 16% $1,982,500 16% 12% 
  -Clark County WA 50,823 13% $1,605,277 13% 32% 
  -Washington County 25,941 7% $782,366 6% 21% 
  -Columbia, Skamania WA, Yamhill 12,997 3% $398,554 3% 24% 
Salem Metro (Marion, Polk) 44,138 11% $1,326,651 11% 26% 
Other Oregon 50,795 13% $1,672,070 14% 25% 
Other WA State 42,950 11% $1,492,867 12% 15% 
All other places 10,918 3% $370,032 3% 3% 
Total, all locations 396,663 100% $12,136,801 100% 29% 
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